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The paper provides an intuitive explanation – seen from an efficiency point of view – 
of the optimal commodity tax structure as the result of a trade-off between two 
objectives: 1) the objective of maintaining the first-best pattern of consumption of 
produced commodities, and 2) the objective of not discouraging the supply of labour. 
It supports this insight using a utility function with the explicit representation of the 
use of time, and using a functional form based on this utility function, which has 
sufficient flexibility not to predetermine the outcome of tax simulations, contrary to 
commonly employed functional forms which impose separability between 
consumption and leisure. The paper supplements the work of Atkinson and Stern 
(1980, 1981) by generalising the parameterised functional form they consider, and by 
pointing out the optimal tax implication of their analysis. It supplements the work by 
Sandmo (1990) and others by applying standard results to the analysis of optimal 
taxation with home production, facilitating the derivation of results and their 
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1 Introduction 
 
The first order conditions, which characterise the optimal commodity tax structure, are 
even by experts in the theory of optimal taxation considered “quite impenetrable from an 
intuitive point of view” (Boadway 1997). This may explain why optimal tax theory has 
had a limited impact in praxis. Two seemingly contradictory strands of traditional 
wisdom, one saying that the optimal tax structure should be proportional, and the other 
that commodities should be taxed according to their price elasticities have in general 
dominated economists’ contributions to the tax reform debate. The Corlett-Hague (1953) 
rule that commodities should be taxed according to their complementarity with leisure 
has also played a role, although a more limited one, partly because misunderstandings 
with respect to the proper role of normalisation have cast doubt on what significance to 
attach to the rule. The three sets of ideas may seem contradictory, but each conveys a 
relevant insight, and the special conditions under which the one or the other corresponds 
to the optimal tax structure, are well known to those familiar with the theory of optimal 
taxation. What in general determines the optimal tax structure is, however, not well 
understood. 
 
An obvious way to gain insight into what explains the optimal tax structure is simulation 
studies based on estimated parameterised functional forms, and in fact this approach has 
been pursued from the outset of the development of modern optimal tax theory. However, 
these efforts received an early set-back with the realisation that the straitjacket imposed 
by the assumption of additive separability, made in most demand studies, severely 
restricted the results which could be obtained. A reaction to this impasse was the use of 
so-called flexible forms (see for example Wales and Woodland 1979), but since they in 
general do not globally satisfy the conditions on utility functions of monotonicity and 
quasi-convexity, flexible forms turned out to be of limited use as the basis for tax 
simulations with the objective of gaining a theoretical insight. 
 
This motivated Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) to try a different tack, representing two 
related aspects of labour supply and commodity demand: 1) that goods are usually 
purchased for use in particular activities, and 2) that these activities involve the use of 
time. In conjunction with Gomulka they estimated, based on British survey data for 1973, 
a linear demand system augmented with the representation of the use of time according to 
the Becker theory of household production (Becker 1965). They used the estimated 
system to evaluate the implication of a switch from direct to indirect taxation. But 
although they justified their approach with the importance for the optimal tax structure of 
interaction of consumption with leisure, they did not take the analysis to its logical 
conclusion, neither by investigating whether a tax reform involving higher taxes on goods 
with high time requirements would improve welfare, nor by deriving optimal tax rates. 
However, an important aspect of the contribution of Atkinson and Stern is that they 
demonstrated, drawing on results established by Pollak and Wachter (1975), that when 
incorporating household production into the utility function, standard theory of demand 
can still be applied to the resulting demand system. 
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For a number of years not much attention seems to have been given to this approach. The 
new line of research opened up by Sandmo (1990) on the implications of taking Becker’s 
theory of home production into account in optimal tax theory did not make reference to 
the earlier work by Atkinson and Stern. Neither did the subsequent work by Kleven, 
Richter and Sørensen (1999) based on essentially the same framework as Sandmo, nor 
the recent contribution by Kleven (2000) who derives the optimal tax structure based on a 
more general representation of home production.  
 
Computable General Equilibrium models, which are increasingly being used for the 
quantitative assessment of tax reforms, in general employ functional forms, which 
impose separability between leisure and consumption, with adverse, and not always fully 
recognised, implications for the policy relevance of the simulation results. On this 
background in the context of analyses of optimal support to low income households 
(Munk 1998) and the welfare implications of green tax reforms (Munk 1999) I adopted a 
parameterised representation of household preferences, motivated, as Atkinson and Stern, 
by the need for a flexible representation of the interaction between leisure and 
consumptions. Building on these previous contributions, the present paper demonstrates, 
that what I call the Constant Elasticities of Substitution utility function with explicit 
representation of the Use of Time, CESUT for short, is a useful tool for tax simulation 
studies and for the calculation of optimal tax structures.  Contrary to additive separable 
functional forms it is sufficiently flexible to represent differences between various 
commodities with respect to their complementarity with leisure, and still relatively easy 
to interpret and to implement in simulation studies. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to add to the understanding of what determines the 
optimal tax structure. It does this by demonstrating, at the level of 1) standard utility 
functions, 2) utility functions with the explicit representation of the use of time, and 3) in 
terms of the parameters of the CESUT, how the optimal tax structure can be understood 
as the result of a compromise between two objectives: 1) the objective of not distorting 
the first-best pattern of consumption of produced commodities, and 2) the objective of 
encouraging the supply of labour.  
 
In addition, the paper supplements the work of Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) by 
generalising the parameterised functional form they consider, and by pointing out the 
optimal tax implication of their analysis; it supplements the work by Sandmo (1990) and 
others by applying standard results to the analysis of optimal taxation with home 
production, facilitating the derivation of results and their interpretation, and thus helping 
to clarify certain conceptual ambiguities. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I derive the conditions for an optimal tax 
structure in the standard Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) framework and provide an 
intuitive explanation of what determines the optimal tax structure based on a standard 
utility function. In Section 3 I present a utility function with direct representation of the 
use of time and analyse the properties of the corresponding demand system. In this 
context I clarify a number of conceptual ambiguities with respect to the definition of 
leisure, which have given rise to some misunderstandings as to the interpretation of rules   3 
of normalisation and the Corlett-Hague rule. In Section 4 I use the insight gained in the 
previous sections to explain the optimal tax structure from an intuitive point of view by 
using a utility function with the explicit representation of the use of time and the 
parameterised form of such a function, the CESUT.  A final section summarises and 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  The characterisation of the optimal commodity tax 
structure within a standard Diamond-Mirrlees 
framework 
 
We consider a competitive economy with one representative household and a 
government. The household supplies labour to the market and consumes the produced 
commodities. Labour is labelled 0, and the produced commodities 1,..,N. The index set 
for the produced commodities is C≡ (1,..,N) and for all commodities FC≡ (0,1,..,N). The 
household’s endowment is  () 0,0,..,0 ω ≡ ￿ , its consumption is  () 01 ,. , N cc ,c ≡ c  and its net 
trade  () 01 N ,. , xx ,x ≡≡ − x ￿ ￿ . Consumer prices are  () 01 ,. , N qq ,q ≡ q  and producer prices 
are  () 01 N ,. , pp ,p ≡ p . The government's resource requirements, 
G ≡ x ()
GG G
01 N ,. , xx , x, are 
financed by commodity taxes,  ≡− tqp . The household's preferences are represented by 
a strictly quasi-concave utility function,  () u x . Finally, we assume that production takes 
place according to a linear production structure using labour as the only input. Producer 
prices may therefore be considered as fixed at unity as a matter of normalisation and we 








= ∑ . 
In the endeavour to understand what determines the optimal tax structure it is helpful to 
start by considering two alternative ways of representing the household’s budget 
constraint and the government’s maximisation problem.  The household’s budget 
constraint may be represented either in terms of its choice of market transactions,  i x , 






= ∑ , or in terms its choice of consumption of commodities,  i c , 






= ∑ . In the first case the expenditure function is  () , Eu q  and the 
compensated (net) demand functions are  () , i xu q ,  i∈ FC, in the latter case the 
expenditure function is  () , Mu q  and the (gross) demand functions are  () , i cu q , i∈ FC. 
 
Using the expenditure function approach (see Dixit 1975 and Dixit and Munk 1977), the 
government’s problem may thus be formulated either in terms of tax rates,  ≡− tqp , 
based on net trade   4 
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or based on consumption 
{} ,F C , i qi u Max u
∈  s.t.  
0 0 M() up ω = q, ,  
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−= ∑ q      (2) 
The standard formulation of the optimal tax problem assumes that only the net trade,  i x , 
i∈ FC, of all commodities including labour, can be taxed; in other words it corresponds to 
(1). The rationale for making this assumption is that information about net trade is public, 
involving market transactions between agents, whereas information about consumption is 
private, as it may be observable only within the household. Differentiating the 
corresponding Lagrangian expression 
  ()
 FC  FC




Lu u t x u p x µ λ
∈∈

=+ − − 
 ∑∑ q, q  (3) 
with respect to q, we obtain directly the following well-known Ramsey (1927) 
conditions for an optimal tax structure  
 
FC




=− θ Ε ∑ qq   k∈ FC   (4) 


















q   
Assuming, as a matter of normalisation, that the supply of labour to the market is 










=− θ ∑    k∈ C (5) 
follows directly from (4), defining compensated demand elasticities in terms of 











, i,k∈ C. 
 
The Ramsey interpretation of these conditions is that the compensated demand for all 
commodities should be reduced in approximately the same proportion compared with the   5 
first-best situation where the same government expenditures are financed by a lump-sum 
tax (see Diamond. and Mirrlees 1971). However, as has been pointed out for example by 
Boadway (1997) what this means in terms of the optimal tax structure is far from clear.  
 
Considerable insight may however be gained by comparing the two formulations of the 
government’s maximisation problem. 
 
First, consider the formulation where tax rates are based on net trade, i.e. (1). In this case 






= T, i∈ FC, does not change the household’s budget constraint, and therefore does 
not raise any tax revenue. A proportional tax structure in this sense is therefore not a 
feasible solution to the government’s maximisation problem and therefore evidently 
cannot be an optimal solution. One commodity, for example labour, may therefore, 
without loss of generality, be assumed untaxed. Adding  00 pq =  as a further constraint to 
(1) therefore does not change the optimal solution. 
 
Consider now the formulation where tax rates are based on consumption, i.e. (2). It is in 
this case clear that a proportional tax structure based on the consumption of all 






=  T,  i∈ FC, does generate a tax revenue 





=  on the value of the household’s endowment at 
producer prices,  00 p ω . Whatever the structure of the household’s preferences, a 
proportional tax structure, based on the consumption of all commodities is therefore both 
feasible and first-best. In this case adding the assumption that leisure cannot be taxed, 
imposes a binding constraint on the government’s maximisation problem, in general 
preventing an optimal solution from being achieved. Adding  0 0 pq =  as a further 
constraint to (2) therefore does change the solution to the government’s optimisation 
problem. This makes it clear that imposing the condition that  the consumption of leisure 
cannot be taxed not only make it impossible to achieve the first-best solution, but also 
creates a substitution away from the consumption of produced commodities towards the 
consumption of leisure, and hence a discouragement of the supply of labour compared 
with the first best solution (except, as we shall see, under some very special 
assumptions).  
 
This is a helpful starting point for interpreting the first order conditions for an optimal 
solution to the standard formulation of the government’s problem of choosing tax rates 
based on all market transactions, i.e. (5), because (1) is equivalent to the problem of 
choosing optimal tax rates based on the consumption of all commodities assuming that 
leisure cannot be taxed, i.e. (2), with the added constraint that  00 pq = . It suggests that a 
fruitful angle from which to look at the government’s problem of choosing optimal tax 
rates, when it has to finance its resource requirement by taxes on market transactions   6 
rather than by lump-sum taxes, is to consider the optimal tax structure (5) as the result of 
a compromise between achieving 
 
 
1)  the objective of not distorting the first-best pattern of consumption of the 
produced commodities,  i x , i∈ C, (Objective 1), and  
 
2)  the objective of maintaining the supply of labour (Objective 2). 
 
 
Starting from a proportional tax structure based on the produced commodities it is in 
general possible to encourage the supply of labour (and increase social welfare, see Dixit 
1975) by increasing the tax on the commodities which are highly complementary to 
leisure and by reducing those on commodities which are less so. However doing so 
creates a distortion by making the marginal rate of transformation in consumption differ 
from the marginal rate of transformation in production for the produced commodities. 
The optimal tax structure is achieved at the point where the marginal gain in terms of 
encouragement of the supply of labour corresponds to the marginal loss in terms of 
distortion of the pattern of consumption of the produced commodities. 
 
In the general case of many commodities it is difficult to explain this trade-off in terms of 
elasticities or other parameters characterising the households preferences, but it is helpful 
in the general case in order to establish points of reference to identify two types of utility 
functions where there is no such trade-off. 
 
When consumption is weakly separable from leisure in the household’s preferences and 
homothetic in produced commodities we have  00 ij εε = , i,j∈ C. Distorting the pattern of 
prices for the produced commodities cannot therefore be used to increase the supply of 
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The other special case is where  () () 012 N 0
C
,,, . . , ii
i
Uccc c c uc
∈
=+ ∑  such that the cross 
price elasticities between produced commodities are zero. The optimal tax structure is the 







ε =− θ /    i∈ C (7) 
This rule is often only related to Objective 1 and linked to the Ramsey rule (see for e.g. 
Myles 1995), however the assumption that the cross price elasticities between produced 







ε =θ /    i∈ C (8) 
The optimal tax structure may therefore alternatively be seen as encouraging the labour 
supply, compared to a proportional tax structure based on the produced commodities, by 
having higher taxes on those commodities which are complementary with leisure, i.e. 
where  0 i ε  is small. In other words, for the inverse elasticity rule to be valid the utility 




Explaining the optimal tax structure based on the two objectives also provides an 
intuitive understanding of the Diamond and Mirrlees Production efficiency theorem 
which states that when optimal lump-sum transfers are not feasible, although Pareto 
efficiency is not possible, productive efficiency is still desirable if all market transaction 
can be taxed optimally. In other words, although it is not possible to equate the subjective 
rate of transformation in consumption with the objective rate of transformation in 
production, it is still desirable to maintain the same rate of transformation in all 
production sectors (contrary to what one might expect based on the Theorem of the 
second-best). The intuition behind this result from the point of view adopted here, is that 
distorting the rates of transformation between production sectors does not provide any 
increased leverage with respect to encouraging the supply of labour as long as consumer 
prices can be fixed independently of producer prices. When on the other hand restrictions 
are imposed on the government’s choice of optimal tax rates, influencing producer prices 
may be a way to change consumer prices, and the Production efficiency theorem no 
longer applies (see Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1971 and Munk 1980). 
 
 
3  Adding structure to the representation of household 
preferences 
 
3.1.  Justification for an explicit representation of the use of time 
 
Having reviewed the interpretation of the optimal tax structure based on a general utility 
function we now add more structure to the representation of household preferences so as 
to obtain a better understanding of what determines the optimal tax rates from an intuitive 
point of view. 
 
                                                 
1The question is indeed whether the inverse elasticity rule has not been more misleading than enlightening 
in providing insight into what determines the optimal tax structure. Furthermore, as is not always 
emphasised, the functional form from which the inverse elasticity rule can be derived requires that the 
income elasticity of all produced commodities are zero, or in other words that any increase in lump-sum 
income is used only to increase the consumption of leisure; an implication which is blatantly in 
contradiction with all empirical evidence.   8 
The main justification for differentiating tax rates is likely to be distributional 
considerations. However, in order to design an optimal tax structure it is important to 
know if, based on efficiency considerations, a proportional tax structure is likely to be 
optimal or not. This issue can be looked at from two different angles, a theoretical and a 
practical one:  
 
1)  Is it realistic to assume that household preferences for the produced commodities 
are homothetic and separable from the consumption of leisure? , and  
2)  Is it possible to obtain the relevant information to make the optimal differentiation 
of tax rates?  
. 
Analysis of utility functions with explicit representation of the use of time helps answer 
these questions. As far as the first question is concerned, it is, based even on casual 
observation, clear that consumption of different commodities requires very different uses 
of time (consider for example child care on the one hand and vacation on the other), and 
therefore may have different degrees of complementarity with leisure (or non-market use 
of time to be more precise). As far as the second question is concerned, it is important to 
point out that the government may be able to base its decision on tax rates on other 
information than market information even if it need to base the collection of tax revenue 
only on market information. Even if the complementarities cannot be inferred from 
traditional econometric analysis based on variation in prices and market transactions, the 
government may be able to supplement such information with inferences drawn from 
direct observation of household behaviour with respect to the use of time for the 
consumption of different products, as is known from for example transport economics. 
 
Much applied work, and in particular applied work based on the use of general 
equilibrium models, adds structure to the general representation of household preferences 
by employing additively separable utility functions. However, this assumption severely 
limits the flexibility of the estimating equations from the point of view of optimal tax 
theory, always making a proportional tax structure the optimal solution. Deaton (1981, p 
1) have formulated it as follows: “It is likely that empirically calculated tax rates, based 
on econometric estimates of parameters, will be determined in structure, not by the 
measurement actually made, but by arbitrary, untested (and even unconscious) 
hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience” (quoted from 
Atkinson and Stern 1980). As our initial analysis has suggested, the interaction between 
consumption of leisure and the consumption of the various commodities is one of the two 
factors explaining the optimal tax structure. It is therefore essential in adding structure to 
the representation of household preferences not to assume this interaction away, as is the 
case when assuming separability between leisure and consumption in the household’s 
preferences. 
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3.2.  Utility function with an explicit representation of the use of time 
 
In order to avoid these pitfalls, we specify a utility function, which allows the interaction 
between the consumption of produced commodities and leisure to differ between 
produced commodities. We define a utility function with an explicit representation of the 
use of time, as  
  () () ( ) () ()
01 2
01 1 0 2 2 0 0 ,, , , , . . , ,
N









=− + ∑  is “pure leisure”
2. For each composite good,  i C , the 
preference for the amount purchased of the commodity,  i x , and the time used for its 
consumption,  0
i c , is expressed by a concave function  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c = . These functions 
may be interpreted as representing either household production or consumption 
activities
3. "Leisure" or “non-market use of time” is therefore 
0




c xc c ω
∈
=+= + ∑ . 
Aggregate consumption, C , is a concave function of the composite goods, 
() 12 , ,.., N CC C C C = , and  ()
0
0, UcC is a utility function with standard properties. 
 
The assumption that the household maximises utility subject to its budget constraint may, 
using the expenditure function approach, be expressed as 
 




, 0,1,..,N; ,0,1,..,N C
12 N
00 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 N N 0
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which has all the standard properties of an expenditure function.  
 
                                                 
2 “Pure leisure” is thus defined as the amount of time spent on activities, which are not associated with the 
consumption of purchased commodities or the supply of labour to the market. Pure leisure may for 
empirical purposes be interpreted as non-market use of time which cannot be related to the consumption of 
any specific commodity, as for example the use of time for relaxation in ones home which typically 
involves the use of many durable commodities at the same time. This definition of pure leisure and the 
assumption that it is separable from consumption of produced commodities is useful in applied work, and 
we are not here going to be drawn on whether or not from an ontological point of view all time is spent on 
either consumption or labour. Any scientific theory has to be developed in such a way that it can be applied 
either to data that are available or to data that can potentially be made available, and not by trying to 
represent the world as it “really” is. 
3 The aggregation functions may be interpreted as home production functions, or as just constraining 
household preferences. In the first case, the composite commodity,  i C , is a physical entity resulting from 
the combinations of a purchased commodity and time as in the case of food prepared in the home; in the 
second case, the composite commodity is just a theoretical concept helping to structure the household’s 
preferences, as in the case of childcare where alternative combinations of non-marketed time and the 
purchase of a marketed commodity can satisfy the same well-defined need. The one interpretation may be 
used for one application and the other for another, but it does not matter for the formal analysis.    10 
Assuming that  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c = , i∈ C, and  () 12 , ,.., N CC C C C = are homogenous of degree 
1, we have 





, , MIN   s.t.  ,
i c
EqQ u q c Q C Uc C u ≡+ = ￿  , where  (11) 
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12 N
12 N 1 2 N
, ,.., iC
, ,.., MIN  Q   s.t.  , ,.., / ii
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ii i i i i i i
cx
QQ q q q cq x C c x C  =≡ + 

  i∈ C  (13) 
Since  () 0,, EqQ u ￿ ,  () 12 N , ,.., QQQ Q C , and  () 0, ii i QqqC , i∈ C are expenditure functions  
  01 N , ( , ,.., ) u Eq q q ≡ () () () () () 01 0 1 2 0 2 0 N , , , , ,.., , , N E qQ Qqq Qqq Q qq u ￿  -  0 q 0 ω  (14) 
will also have the standard properties of an expenditure function
4. 
 
This is an essential point; it implies that the corresponding demand system can be 
analysed using standard demand theory and that the insight of standard optimal theory of 
taxation reviewed in the previous section, notably the Corlett and Hague results and the 
Diamond and Mirrlees Production efficiency theorem, can be applied directly. That we 
can apply standard results is not only of considerable analytical convenience, but also 
facilitates the interpretation of results, which exploit the explicit representation of the use 
of time, as has been pointed out by Atkinson and Stern (1980)
5. But in order to exploit 
those advantages it is naturally important to make a correct mapping of the variables 
based on a general utility function and a utility function with an explicit representation of 
the use of time. 
 
The mapping between the standard formulation of the household’s maximisation problem 
and the formulation with the explicit representation of the use of time is illustrated in 
Figure 1. In the case of a standard utility function the household’s preferences are defined 
directly on net trade,  01 N , ,.., xx x . In the case of a utility function with the explicit 
representation of the use of time, the household’s preferences is defined directly only on 
pure leisure,
0
0 c , and aggregate consumption, C , where aggregate consumption is a 
function of the consumption of composite commodities,  () 12 N , ,.., CC C C , and where the 
consumption of each composite commodity,  ,  C i Ci ∈ , is a function,  0 (,)
i
ii Cxc, of the 
purchase of the corresponding commodity and the time used for its consumption. What 
                                                 
4 See also see Pollak and Wachter (1975) 
5 Atkinson and Stern (1980) write: In the formal sense [a model incorporating home production] is no 
different, and we can apply the standard theory of demand, a fact which is worth emphasising in view of the 
claims sometimes made to the contrary. That we can apply standard results is a considerable analytical 
convenience, and allows us to see more clearly how the interpretation of the results differs [when 
incorporating home production]    11 
we have shown is that the behaviour implied by the utility function with explicit 
representation of the use of time,  () () ( ) () ()
01 2 N
01 1 0 2 2 0 N N 0 , , , , ,.., , UcCC xc C xc C x c , is the 
same as that of an appropriate utility function defined on net trade,  () 01 N , ,.., ux x x . 
 
The net trade vector  () 01 N ,. , xx ,x ≡≡ − x ￿ ￿  indicates the household’s interaction with 
the rest of the world, which in optimal tax theory is the only aspect of household 
behaviour, which is assumed to be observable by the government. The use of utility 
functions with the explicit representation of the use of time provides more structure to the 
explanation of changes in x in response to price changes than the general formulation, 
but remains, as we have seen, a special case of the general formulation. It is thus 
inconceivable that optimal tax results obtained for the general case should not be 
applicable to cases where household preferences are represented by utility functions with 




Fig. 1: Alternative representation of household behaviour 
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   12 
 
For example, the Corlett-Hague Rule, which says that commodities, which are 
complementary to leisure from an efficiency point of view, should be taxed at relatively 
high rates, therefore also applies in the case where the household’s preferences are 
represented by a utility function with the explicit representation of the use of time. 
However, to apply the general result naturally requires ‘leisure’ to be defined in the same 
way as in the standard formulation. In order to exploit correctly the insight provided by 
Corlett and Hague’s analysis in explaining the optimal tax structure when home 
production is represented explicitly, it is important to define the term ‘leisure’ as ‘non-
market use of time’. In Corlett and Hague (1953) the distinction between ‘labour’ and 
‘leisure’ reflects only the assumption that “labour” can be taxed and that  ‘leisure’ cannot. 
Since the word ‘leisure‘ for some carries the connotations of ‘pure leisure’ (cf Gronau 
1977), while by others it is used as synonymous with ‘labour’ (cf Myles 1995) a more 
precise terminology should be used when there is a risk of confusion:  instead of ‘leisure’ 
and ‘labour’ the expression  ‘non-market use of time’ and ’market use of time’, 
respectively, should be used. 
 
Figure 1 may also help to clarify how the Diamond-Mirrless Production efficiency 
theorem applies in a model with home production. The Diamond-Mirrlees theorem 
implies, as stated above, that, although Pareto efficiency is not feasible when lump sum 
taxes cannot be used, it is still optimal to maintain the same rate of transformation in all 
production sectors. Since representing home production explicitly, given certain 
regularity conditions, may be interpreted as a utility function with the explicit 
representation of the use of time, which in turn may be considered as a special case of a 
standard utility function, it follows that adopting a Becker type representation of home 
production cannot modify the Diamond-Mirrless Production efficiency theorem, as long 
as the term “production sectors” is defined as by Diamond and Mirrlees. In the Diamond-
Mirrlees framework the term “production sectors” are sectors which produce traded 
commodities. Within these sectors production efficiency is therefore desirable, even 
when home production is represented explicitly. However, when household production is 
explicitly represented it becomes possible to define rates of transformation, which are 
objective rather than subjective, within the household sector. The marginal rate of 
transformation in producing household non-traded goods in the household sector, say, 
between labour and a purchased good, will in general be different from the corresponding 
rate of transformation in the non household production sectors. This may naturally be 
considered as a type of “production inefficiency”, but not in the sense defined by 
Diamond and Mirrlees. Furthermore if  “production inefficiency” is defined in this way, 
then that “production inefficiency” is desirable follows immediately without further 
analysis from the well-known result of optimal tax theory, that when taxation has to be 
based only on market transactions the optimal solution involves that the marginal rate of 
transformation within the household sector must be different from that within the non-
household production sectors. The reason why the optimal solution is not Pareto efficient 
when lump sum taxation is not feasible is exactly that it is not possible to equate the 
marginal rates of transformations within the household sector with those within the non-
household production sectors and still generate revenue to the government. 
   13 
Sandmo (1990), Kleven, Richter and Sørensen (2000) and Kleven (2000) have 
considered optimal tax rules taking Becker’s theory of home production into account. 
Their contributions illustrate that adding structure to the household’s utility function has 
the potential of improving our understanding of what determines the optimal tax 
structure. The fact that Becker’s theory of home production may be seen as a special case 
of a standard formulation of the household’s utility maximising problem, as in this paper, 
furthermore facilitates derivation of results and their interpretation. For example, Kleven, 
Richter and Sørensen (2000) find that it may be desirable to tax an input good, i.e. a 
good, which is used in home production, at a lower rate than other goods, although it is 
more complementary with what they call “leisure” than with other goods. They interpret 
this as a counter-example to the Corlett and Hague rule. This is misleading. The apparent 
discrepancy is a result of their use of the term ‘leisure’ to indicate non-market use of time 
net of time used in home production (which I have called “pure leisure”), whereas it in 
the Corlett and Hague framework it is non–market use of time (i.e. including time used 
for home production). Only because they have changed the meaning of words do their 
results seem to conflict with Corlett and Hague results. They also see the results of their 
analysis as providing a counter-example to the Diamond-Mirrlees Production efficiency 
theorem. Also this is misleading. When representing home production explicitly, 
production efficiency is still desirable when the term “production sectors” is defined as in 
the Diamond-Mirrlees framework as sectors producing traded commodities and when the 
home production functions,  0 (,)
i
ii i CC x c = , are concave functions. 
 
The analysis of optimal taxation taking home production into account is, as we have seen, 
only a special case of the analysis of optimal taxation based on a standard representation 
of household preferences. It seems therefore inconceivable that results based on a model 
with explicit representation of home production based on standard concavity assumptions 





3.3.  Flexibility with respect to the complementarity of leisure 
 
We define a parameterised utility function, CESUT (Constant Elasticities of Substitution 
utility function with explicit representation of the Use of Time, (see Munk 1998, 1999) as 
  () () ( ) () ()
0 1 11 2 12 N 1N 2 3
01 1 0 2 2 0 N N 0 ,, ; , , ; , . . , , ; ; UcCC xc C xc C x c σσ σ σ σ  (15) 
where 
1
; 0 (, )
ii
ii Cxc σ , i∈ C,  ()
2
12 N , ,.., ; CC C C σ  and  ()
03
0 ,; UC cσ  are CES functions 
characterised by elasticities of substitution 
1i σ , i∈ C, 
2 σ  and 
3 σ , respectively.  
 
                                                 
6 See also the related point made at page 593 in Kleven, Richter and Sørensen (2000) in response to 
comments made by a referee.   14 
We now want to demonstrate that the CESUT is quite flexible with respect to 
representation of household preferences in particular, allowing different commodities to 
have different degrees of complementarity with leisure. 
 
Differentiating (14) we get the corresponding demand system  
 













i∈ C (16) 
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≡  as 
the share of the costs of the consumption of commodity j in the total costs of composite j 






≡  the share of the 
composite j in the total cost of consumption (including the consumption of time except 
pure leisure), we get 
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, we have 
  () ()
12 11 ( 1 )
i
ii i i i i i aa ba b c σσσ
3 ε= − − − − − −      C i∈  (22) 
 
2 (1 ) i j jj jj ab ab c σσ
3 ε= − −      , C ij ∈  (23) 
  ()()
12
0 1( 1 )
i
ii i aa a a c σσ σ
3 ε= − + − − −     1 ,2 i∈  (24) 
  ()() ()
12
0 1( 1 )
i
ii i i aa a a c ασ σ σ
3 ε= − + − − − do.    1 ,2 i∈  (25) 




=∑ .  
 
The elasticities of substitution between the commodities and leisure, io σ ,  C i∈ , are 
related to the compensated elasticities by  00 ii o s σ ε=  where  0 s  is the share of labour 
income in full income. Differences in  0 i ε  therefore reflect differences in the 
complementarity with leisure of the different commodities. 
 
  The compensated elasticity of commodity i with respect to the price of labour,  0 i ε , 
depends on three elements (see 24): 
 





1 ε= − . This element 
is always positive with respect to the value of  0 i ε , and is larger, the larger the amount of 
time used for the consumption of commodity i,  () 1 i a − , and the larger the elasticity of 
substitution between time and the commodity within the composite commodity i, 
1i σ . 
 









−) ε = − ∑ . This element may be positive or negative with respect to the 
value of  0 i ε  depending on whether commodity i requires a relatively large amount of 
time for its consumption, i.e.  i aa < , or relatively small amount, i.e.  i aa > . In the first 
case, an increase in the price of the commodity and hence in the corresponding composite 
commodity results in a shift to composite commodities which involve the use of 
relatively less time, drawing in the direction of a small  0 i ε ; in the second case the 
opposite will be the case, drawing in the direction of a relatively large  0 i ε . The elasticity 
between composite commodities, 
2 σ , amplifies the effect whatever its direction. 
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The pure leisure element, which is represented by the third term: (1 ) ac σ
3 −  is always 
positive with respect to the value of  0 i ε , and the larger the share of the household’s time 
endowment used for pure leisure (1 ) c −  and the larger the elasticity of substitution 
between leisure and consumption, σ
3, the larger the effect.  
  
In particular we see that 
 
1) for  i aa > , i.e. when a relatively small amount of time is used for the 
consumption of commodity i, then relatively large substitution elasticities 
1i σ , 
2 σ  




1i σ  , i.e. when the between element dominates, then a relatively large 
amount of time, (1 i a −) , used for the consumption of commodity i  imply a 




1i σ  , i.e. when the within element dominates, then a relatively large 
amount of time, (1 i a −) , used for the consumption of commodity i imply a 
relatively large  0 i ε . 
 
It is thus relatively easy by specifying different values of the parameters of the CESUT, 
i a , 
1i σ , 
2 σ , to represent different degrees of complementarity with leisure for the 
different commodities. In contrast to the additive separable utility functions, as the CES, 
the CESUT therefore allows the complementarity with leisure to differ between 
commodities. Furthermore each of the parameters of the CESUT has a clear economic 
interpretation, facilitating the intuitive understanding of the relation between the 




4  The explanation of the optimal tax structure as the 
result of a trade-off between the two objectives  
 
I want in this section to demonstrate how utility functions with the direct representation 
of the use of time, and in particular the CESUT may be used to provide insight into how 
the optimal tax structure is a compromise between the objective of not distorting the first-
best pattern of consumption of the produced commodities,  i x , i∈ C, (Objective 1), and the 
objective of encouraging the supply of labour (Objective 2). 
   17 
4.1.  Many commodities  
 
In Section 2 two cases where there is no trade-off between the two objectives has already 
been identified. Within the framework of a utility function with explicit representation of 
the use of time it is possible to identify a third case, and furthermore to improve our 
understanding of why in one of the two cases already identified there is no such trade-off. 
 






= T>1, i∈ FC, based on the 
consumption of all commodities, including leisure, is a first-best solution whatever the 
structure of the household’s preferences. Such a tax structure involves higher consumer 
prices,  () 01 N '' , ., Tp Tp , Tp ≡ q , and thus higher prices for composite commodities, 
() 0 '' , ii i Q Q Tp Tp = , i∈ C than the first-best solution based on lump sum taxation where 
the prices for composite commodities are  () 0 ', ii i QQ p p = , i∈ C. 
 
If we impose the constraint that leisure cannot be taxed, i.e. that  00 qp = , it is, as we have 
seen, in general not possible to achieve the first-best solution. Although it is possible to 
choose tax rates for produced commodities to generate prices for composite commodities 
which create no distortion between the composite commodities, within the aggregation 
function  C() 12 , ,.., N CC C , such tax rates will involve higher prices for produced 
commodities relative to the price of non-market use of time, thus in general distorting the 
allocation between the consumption of produced commodities and time within the 
aggregation functions for the composite commodities,  0 (,)
i
ii Cxc,  i∈ C. 
 
However, in the case where all the aggregation functions for the composite commodities, 
0 (,)
i
ii Cxc, i∈ C, are Leontief, and where the household’s consumption of pure leisure, 
0
0 c , is either a function only of the level of utility or nil
8, distorting the price ratio between 
produced commodities and time does not distort the allocation. A tax vector where leisure 
is untaxed, i.e. t =() 11N N 0, ., qp , q p −− , will therefore establish a first-best solution if the 
tax rates on produced commodities are chosen so that the relative prices for the composite 
commodities are the same as if the government’s resource requirement had been financed 
by a proportional tax structure based on the consumption on all commodities, i.e. if  
 
  () () () () 00 , 1/(1 ) , 1/(1 ) ii i i i Qpp t Q p p ττ += − −     i∈ C (26) 
 
where  τ <1 is the rate of tax on the household’s endowment of time net of the fixed 
amount used for pure leisure required to finance the government’s resource requirement. 
Since for this utility function the aggregation functions are Leontief 
 
                                                 
8 This is the case if  ()
0
0 , U cCis Leontief or if c=1, i.e. if the household consumes no pure leisure.     18 
() () () ( ) () 00 '1 / ( 1 ) 1 1 ii i i i i i i Qq a p a q a q t a τ =− −+ = −++   i∈ C (27) 
 











  i∈ C (28) 
 
is a first-best solution.
  Commodities that require relative much time for their 
consumptions, i.e. where  i a is relatively small, is thus taxed at a relatively high rates.
9  
 
That the optimal solution for this special utility function involves the commodity tax rates 
to be inversely related to the share of purchased goods in the value of the corresponding 
composite commodities provides a useful benchmark for the interpretation of the optimal 
tax structure for more realistic utility functions with the explicit representation of time. 
 
The utility function considered by Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981) is a special case of a 
utility function with explicit representation of time (9) where  () ()
0
01 2 N ,, , . . , UcCCC C  is a 
Stone-Geary utility function and the  ()
1
0 ,,  C ii Cx c i ∈  are Leontief functions. The 
corresponding expenditure function is  
() , Eu ≡ q () () ( ) () 010 11 2022 02 ,, ; ,, ; , . ., ; ; , , , , NN i i EqQq q Q q q Q q q i F C i F Cu αα α γβ ∈∈ ￿ (29) 










≡+ − ++ − ∑ ∏ q            (30) 
where  i γ and  i β  are parameters of the Stone Geary utility function. Estimating this 
functional form on British survey data for 1973 they discovered significant difference in 
the time requirement of different goods (high for tobacco, low for services). 
 
Since they assume that the  ()
1
0 , ii Cx c functions are Leontief, and that households 
consume no pure leisure the optimal tax structure corresponding to this utility function is 
thus given by (28) and thus first-best with high rates of taxation on those commodities 
with high time requirements. 
                                                 
9 This case was first identified (but not provided the same interpretation) by Kleven (2000). He derives 












+ = −      ∈ ∑  to be satisfied by an optimal tax 
structure from the government’s tax optimisation problem constrained by a Becker type representation of 









kj =   ,   ∈  from these 
conditions in the case where 
1
0,
kk k C ε =∈. This is not strictly correct since at the first best optimum  0 θ = .   19 
 
We have thus identified a third case, where there is no trade-off between the two 
objectives. 
 
a) The case which we have just considered where  0 (,)
i
ii Cxc,  i∈ C, and 
()
0
0, UcCare Leontief, 
 
b) the case where both  () 12 , ,.., N CC C C C =  and  ()
0
0, UcCare Leontief, and thus 
ii ii
1 ε= ε  and  0 ij ε=  (see (17) and (18)). In this case the optimal tax structure 
corresponds to the inverse elasticity rule given in (7), and 
 
c) the case where the consumption of individual commodities is not associated 
with the use of time, i.e.  () 12 , ,.., N CC x x x =  is homothetic and the optimal tax 
structure therefore proportional (6). 
 
As has been pointed out by Kleven (2000), it is possible to derive the optimal tax 
formulae for each of the three cases based on the utility function with explicit 
representation of the use of time. However, none of the three different special types of 
utility functions with explicit representation of the use of time are particularly realistic, 
and in fact not in themselves very helpful in relation to our endeavour. For different 
reasons they cannot be used to illustrate the trade-off between 1) the objective of 
maintaining the first-best pattern of consumption (Objective 1), and 2) the objective of 
discouraging the consumption of leisure (Objective 2). The first case, where for each 
good the non-market use of time is fixed as a share of the consumption of the good, a tax 
structure which is equivalent to a tax on leisure (in the meaning non-market use of time) 
establishes a first-best solution and there is therefore no trade-off between the two 
objectives. In the second case the pattern of consumption of composite commodities has 
been fixed by assuming a Leontief structure for the function aggregating the composite 
commodities. The only substitution possibility is therefore within the composite 
commodities. However, within a composite commodity a change in the use of time in 
response to a change in the price of the commodity for which it is used directly 
determines the change in the consumption of the corresponding commodity 
independently of any other price changes, and vice versa. Achieving Objective 2 
therefore does not involve any costs in terms Objective 1. In other words, in this case the 
two objectives are not in conflict with each other. In the third case, which implies 
separability between consumption and leisure, there is no trade-off between the two 
objectives because changing a proportional tax structure for the produced commodities 
will imply sacrificing Objective 1 without gaining anything in terms of Objective 2. The 
optimal tax structure therefore involves maintaining the first-best pattern of consumption 
of produced goods, not because it would not be desirable to reduce the consumption of 
leisure, but because differentiating the tax rates for the produced goods has no effect on 
the consumption of leisure. 
   20 
However, these three cases represent rather extreme assumptions. In general changing the 
parameters of the CESUT,  i a , 
1i σ , 
2 σ , it is possible to change the trade-off between the 
two objectives and thus the optimal tax structure. To what extent a differentiated tax 
structure will encourage the supply of labour (Objective 2) depends on to what extent the 
compensated elasticities with respect to the price of labour are different for different 
commodities. As we have seen, the compensated elasticities with respect to the price of 
labour,  0 i ε , i∈ C, may be related in a fairly transparent way to the parameters of the 
CESUT. However changes in the parameters of the CESUT may also affect the costs of 
distorting the first-best pattern of consumption of produced commodities (Objective 1). 
Larger elasticities of substitution in general result in increased distortionary costs of a 
differentiated tax structure.  
 
In the case of many commodities it is difficult rigorously to trace how changes in the 
parameters of the CESUT influence the trade-off between the two objectives and thus the 
optimal tax structure. For analytical convenience we therefore turn to the case of only 
two produced commodities. 
 
4.2.  Two produced commodities  
 
In the case of only two produced commodities, as originally considered by Corlett and 
Hague (1953), the trade-off is easier to establish. Solving (4) for the optimal tax rates, 
assuming  0 0 t =  as a matter of normalisation, we have, 
  () 12 22
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  () 21 11
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   (31) 
and since 
FC




=∈ ∑ , the optimal tax structure may also be expressed as 
 
1
11 22 10 1











.   (32) 
Which commodity will be taxed at the highest rate depends entirely on the sign of 
10 20 εε −  and, for given value of  11 22 εε −− , the difference is the greater the greater the 
numerical value of  10 20 εε − , and for given values of  10 ε and  20 ε  the difference is smaller 
the greater is  11 22 εε −− . 
 
We therefore define the Indicator of the objective of maintaining the first-best pattern of 
consumption of produced commodities (Objective 1) as   21 
  11 1 2 2 I εε ≡− −    (33) 
and the Indicator of the objective of increasing the supply of labour (Objective 2) as 
  21 02 0 I εε ≡−    (34) 
In the literature (see for example Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, and Myles 1995) the focus 
has been on how the optimal tax structure contributes to the second objective, viz. the 
Corlett-Hague rule that the commodities which is most complementary with leisure, i.e. 
with the smallest the elasticities of substitution between the commodity i and leisure,  0 i σ , 
should be taxed at relative high rates to encourage the supply of labour. However, the 
optimal tax structure depends, as we have seen, on both indicators. Having this in mind is 




We now want to show that it is possible to modify the relative importance of the two 
objectives and thus explain the optimal tax structure by changing the parameters of the 
CESUT utility function. 
 
In the case of the CESUT utility function the indicators for the two Objectives can be 
expressed in terms of shares and the parameters of the functional form rather than being 
endogenously determined as a function of the equilibrium solution. This allows the trade-
off between the two objectives to be compared for different values of the parameters of 
the CESUT and thus the intuition for what determines the optimal tax structure to be 
enhanced.  
 
Substituting for  ij ε , by (22)-(24) the indicators for Objective 1 now becomes  
  1 I = ()()( )( )
11 12 2
1 1 1122 1 1 2 2 1 1 (1 (1 (1 ) a a ab ab a b a b c σσ σ σ
3 −+ −+ − )  + − )   +  +   −  (35) 
and the indicator for Objective 2  
  2 I = ( )()()
21 11 2
12 1 2 11 aa a a σσσ  −  +− −− . (36) 
                                                 
10 These results have been derived assuming that labour is untaxed as a matter of normalisation. However, 
the Corlett-Hague rule does not depend on this particular normalisation rule. Although tax rates change 
under renormalisation the relative size of consumer prices, and hence the relative size of the tax rates 
remain the same; if one commodity is taxed at a higher rate than another commodity for one optimal tax 
vector this will also be the case for other optimal tax vectors:  If t=q-p, where  0 t =0, is the vector of 
taxes before renormalisation, and  k =− tq p ￿ , where  0 k > , is the vector of taxes after normalisation, then 
ij t t > ￿￿  if 
ij tt > . The Corlett and Hague result therefore does not just reflect the normalisation rule 
adopted, contrary to what  for example is argued by Myles (1995). 
   22 
The indicator for Objective 2 determines independently of the value of the indicator for 
Objective 1 which commodity is taxed at the highest level. However, how much the tax 
structure diverges from a proportional tax structure depends, on the values of both the 
indicators.  
 
Substituting in (32) by (18) -(21) and then (22)-(24) we get the following expression for 








 + (1 )










.   (37) 
It is now possible to trace how changes in the parameters of the CESUT determine the 
optimal tax structure through their effect on the indicators for the two objectives.  
 
To support the intuition for how changes in the parameters change the optimal tax 




Table 1 Indicators for objective 1 and 2 and the optimal relative tax rates 
 
 Indicator  for 
Objective 1. 
  1 I  
Indicator for 
Objective 2. 
  2 I  
Optimal relative tax 
rates 
12 / tt  
Set 1  0,180  -0,150  3,50 
Set 2  0,330  0,080  0,38 
Set 3  0,280  -0,150  3,45 
Set 4  0,390  0,000  1,00 
 
Benchmark values of government’s requirement and of the household’s net trade in an 
economy with two produced commodities and one primary factor, labour, are provided in 




3 σ , 1 a , 2 a  
and c) are provided in Annex Table 2. The corresponding matrix of compensated price 
elasticities consolidated at the level of the three traded commodities,  ,, ( 0 , 1 , 2 ) ij ij ε∈ , are 
provided in Annex Table 3. 
 
The benchmark data and the parameters specified imply that the value of the household’s 
endowment is 300. Since the governments requirement is 50, a tax on the value of 
endowment at rate τ = 1/6 would therefore be sufficient to raise the revenue required for 
the government without distorting the resource allocation. In the case of such a tax, the 
real income for the household would be 100. 
                                                 
11 A somewhat similar tax formula has been derived and analysed by Kleven (2000).   23 
 
For the first set of parameters the share of full income spent on pure leisure, 1-c, as well 
as the elasticities of substitution within the commodity composites, 
11 σ  and 
12 σ  are all 
fixed at 0. For this set of parameters the optimal solution is thus first-best, although lump 
sum taxation is not possible. Assuming  0 0 t =  as a matter of normalisation the optimal 
























   (38) 
 
This tax structure is first-best because it effectively raises the price of time by the same 
amount for all uses as had the revenue been raised directly by a tax on the household’s 
endowment. At the optimum there is therefore no conflict between the two objectives. 
 
The indicator for Objective 1 (the pattern of consumption of produced commodities) 




3 σ . The larger the 
elasticities, the larger the distortionary costs of a differentiated tax structure. However the 
effect of changes in these substitution elasticities on the indicator for Objective 2 (the 
encouragement of the labour supply) are more complex. In the general case the impact of 
changes in  1 a and  2 a  on both objectives depend on the level of the substitution 
elasticities. 
 
To facilitate the interpretation of the optimal tax formulae we consider the less general 
case where 
11 12 1 σσσ == . 
 
The indicator for Objective 1 may in this case be written as 
  ()
12
11 22 1 2 1 2 (2 (1 ) aa aaa a c σσ σ
3 ε+ ε= − − − ) − + − − −  (39) 
and the indicator for Objective 2 as 
  () ()
12
10 20 1 2 1 2 aa aa σσ ε − ε= −  −  +  −  .   (40) 
A revenue neutral increase in the tax on Commodity 1 accompanied by a decrease in the 
tax on Commodity 2 has two separate effects on the consumption of leisure. The first 
term,  ()
1
12 aa σ − −   , the within effect is the substitution effect within the composite 
aggregation functions, 
1
110 (,) Cxc and 
2
22 0 (,) Cxc. This effect is positive (i.e. the effect on 
the supply of labour is negative) if  1 a < 2 a . The second effect, ()
2
12 aa σ  −  , the between 
effect, is due to the substitution between composite commodities within the aggregation   24 
function  12 (,) CC C . This effect is negative (i.e. the effect on the supply of labour is 
positive) if  1 a < 2 a . The relative strength of the two effects determines which commodity 
is taxed at the highest rate. For example, for 

















     (41) 
because the second effect dominates, (Changing the benchmark parameters, such that 
1 0.2 σ = , 
2 0 σ =  and c=1, results in  10 20 ε− ε = 0,080 in stead of  –0,150 and the ratio of 
optimal tax rates to become  12 0.38 tt=  rather than 3,50). Conversely for 












=>      (42) 
because the first effect dominates (for c=1,  10 20 ε− ε =-0,150 and the ratio of optimal tax 
rates becomes  12 3.45 tt= ). For 











=  .    (43) 
(For 
1 0.2 σ = , 
2 0.2 σ =  and c=1,  11 22 ε+ ε = 0,00 and the ratio of optimal tax rates is 
12 1 tt= ). 
 
That commodities, which require a relative large amount of time for their consumption, 
are relatively complementary with leisure and therefore should be taxed at a relatively 
high rate may be intuitively plausible and is suggested by the special case where the time-
consumption composites are Leontief. However as the analysis of the CESUT illustrates 
this intuition may be misleading. In the situation where the substitution possibilities 
within the time-consumption composites are relatively large the indicator for Objective 2 
will be greater than 1 if the share of time in composite 1 is smaller than in composite 2. In 
this case commodity 1, which use a relatively small amount of time for its consumption, 
will be taxed at a relatively high rate. 
 
   25 
5  Summary and concluding remarks 
 
I have provided an intuitive explanation of what determines the optimal tax structure as a 
trade-off between two objectives: 1) the objective of not distorting the consumption of 
produced commodities, and 2) the objective of not discouraging the supply of labour. I 
have shown that the use of a utility function with the explicit representation of the use of 
time helps to improve the intuition for this trade-off. The analyses supplements the work 
of Atkinson and Stern (1980,1981) by generalising the parameterised functional form 
they consider and by indicating the corresponding optimal tax results; it supplements the 
work by Sandmo (1990), Kleven (2000) and others, by applying standard results to the 
analysis of optimal taxation with home production, facilitating derivation of results and 
interpretation. It thus helps to clarify certain conceptual ambiguities in the literature. 
Finally, I have demonstrated that such utility functions are not only useful as a basis for 
theoretical analysis, but can easily be parameterised and thus be used in applied work as 
an alternative to functional forms, which impose separability between consumption and 
leisure, and which may therefore result in misleading conclusions from simulations of 
changes in tax policy.   26 
References 
 
Atkinson, A. B. and J. Stiglitz (1976), “The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus 
Indirect Taxation”, Journal of Public Economics, 6, 55-75 
 
Atkinson, A. B. and J. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on Public Economics, McGraw-Hill 
 
Atkinson, A. B. and N.H. Stern (1980), “On the Switch from Direct to Indirect Taxation” 
Journal of Public Economics, 14, 195-224 
 
Atkinson, A. B. and N. Stern (1981), “On labour supply and commodity demands”, in 
A.S. Deaton, (ed.) Essays in the Theory and Measurement of Consumer Behaviour, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
 
Becker, G.S. (1965), “A Theory of the Allocation of Time”, Economic Journal, 75, 493-
517 
 
Boadway, Robin (1997), “The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics” in 
Eaton, B. Curtis and Richard G. Harris (eds.), “Trade, Technology and Economics: 
Essays in Honour of Richard G. Lipsey”, Elgar 
 
Corlett, W. J. and D. C. Hague (1953), “Complementarity and Excess Burden of 
Taxation”, Review of Economic Studies, 21, 21-30 
 
Dasgupta, P. and J. E. Stiglitz, (1972), “On Optimal Taxation and Public Production”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 39, 87-103 
 
Deaton, A. S. (1981), "Optimal Taxes and the Structure of Preferences", Econometrica, 
19, 273-92 
 
Diamond, P.A. and J.A. Mirrlees (1971) “Optimal Taxation and Public Production 1: 
Production Efficiency and 2: Tax rules”, American Economic Review, 61, 8-27 and 261-
78 
 
Dixit, A. (1975), "Welfare Effect of Tax and Price Changes", Journal of Public 
Economics, 4, 103-123 
 
Dixit, A. and K. J. Munk (1977) "Welfare Effect of Tax and Price Changes. A 
Correction", Journal of Public Economics, 8, 103-107 
 
Gronau, R. (1977), “Leisure, Home Production and Work- The theory of the Allocation 
of Time Revisited”, Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1099-1123 
 
Kleven, H. J., W. F. Richter and P. B. Sørensen (2000) ”Optimal Taxation and Household 
Production”, Oxford Economic Papers 52, 584-594 
   27 
Kleven, H. J. (2000) "Optimal Taxation and the Allocation of Time", Paper presented at 
the 56
th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, August 2000. 
 
Munk, K. J. (1980), ‘Optimal taxation with some non-taxable commodities’, Review of 
Economic Studies, 47, 755-765 
 
Munk, K. J. (1998),"Optimal support to low income households”, Paper presented at the 
54
th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance Congress, August 1998 
 
Munk, K. J. (1999),"A Double Dividend after all?”, Paper presented at the 55
th Congress 
of the International Institute of Public Finance Congress, August 1999 
 
Myles, G. R. (1995) “Public Economics”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Pollak, R.A. and M. L. Wachter (1975), “The Relevance of the Household Production 
Function and Its Implication for the Allocation of Time”, Journal of Political Economy, 
83, 255-78 
 
Ramsey, F.P. (1927) " A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation", Economic Journal, 37, 
47-61 
 
Stiglitz, J.E. and P. Dasgupta, (1971), “Differential Taxation, Public Goods and 
Economic Efficiency”, Review of Economic Studies, 39, 151-74 
 
Sandmo, A. (1990), “Tax Distortions and Household Production”, Oxford Economic 
Papers 42, 78-90 
 
Wales, T.J. and A. D. Woodland (1979), Labour Supply and Progressive Taxes, Review 
of Economic Studies, 46, 83-95 
   28 
Annex Table 1.  Benchmark data where the government requirement is financed by a 
lump sum tax  
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Annex Table 2: Parameters and optimal tax solutions 
 
Parameters    Set 1  Set 2  Set 3  Set 4 
Elasticity of substitution between 
commodity 1 and the time used for its 
consumption 
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commodity 2 and the time used for its 
consumption 










Elasticity of substitution between the 
composite commodities 










Elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and pure leisure 
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Share of time in composite 
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Results    Set 1  Set 2  Set 3  Set 4 
Tax on labour  0 t   0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Tax on consumption of commodity 1   1 t   1,40 0,22 1,45 0,55 
Tax on consumption of commodity 2   2 t   0,40 0,58 0,42 0,55 
Labour supply   0 x   150,00  142,30  146,42  141,52 
Consumption commodity 1   1 x   10,00  9,29 9,64 9,15 
Consumption commodity 2   2 x   90,00  83,00 86,78 82,37 
Real income    100,00  98,21 99,17 98,02   29 
Annex Table 3: Compensated elasticities 
 
 
Set 1: ij ε   Price j 
Quantity i  1 2 0 
1  -0,100 0,210 -0,110 
2  0,040 -0,080 0,040 
0  0,020 -0,030 0,020 
  
Set 2: ij ε   Price j 
Quantity i  1 2 0 
1  -0,170 -0,080 0,250 
2  -0,010 -0,160 0,170 
0  -0,020 -0,150 0,170 
  
Set 3: ij ε   Price j 
Quantity i  1 2 0 
1  -0,120 0,140 -0,020 
2  0,030 -0,160 0,130 
0  0,000 -0,110 0,110 
  
Set 4: ij ε   Price j 
Quantity i  1 2 0 
1  -0,200 0,010 0,190 
2  0,000 -0,190 0,190 
0  -0,020 -0,170 0,190 
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